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Abstract: NATO has made progress constructing the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which have assumed the lead for
most combat operations, resulting in declining NATO casualties.
The ANSF’s ability to suppress the Taliban insurgency, however,
depends on NATO’s training and equipping it sufficiently to replace the military intelligence, aviation support, logistics, and other
enablers NATO now provides. The Afghan government also needs
to improve its performance. Further progress is likely, but a renewal
of the civil war that devastated Afghanistan in the 1990s remains a
fearful possibility.

I

n June 2013, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) assumed
the lead combat role throughout Afghanistan against the tenacious
Taliban insurgency. US combat forces in Afghanistan are scheduled
to decrease to 32,000 by the end of the year.1 After next year, the United
States intends to have a smaller Enduring Presence force operating under
NATO command and a separate focused counterterrorism mission. If
the ANSF performs well in the next year with a declining US military
presence, we could see a successful NATO-ANSF transfer. The risk
remains uncomfortably high, however, that the Afghan government
will eventually succumb to an onslaught of the intensely ideologically
motivated Taliban fighters linked to al Qaeda Islamist extremists. Both
groups enjoy sanctuary and support in neighboring countries. Still, the
most likely scenario is renewed civil war among multiple armed factions
such as Afghanistan experienced during the 1990s.
Even a flawless ANSF-NATO handoff would not guarantee a
benign end to the conflict. Many political, economic, diplomatic, and
myriad other variables could affect the war’s outcome. In his 2012
speech at Bagram Air Base, US President Barack Obama identified five
lines of American effort regarding Afghanistan in coming years. In
addition to strengthening the ANSF, these efforts included building a
strong Afghan-American partnership; supporting an Afghan-led peace
process; enhancing cooperation between Afghanistan and its region;
and successfully implementing the 2014 security, economic, and political
transition. The latter goal includes transitioning to an ANSF-led war, a
private sector-led economy, and successfully holding free and fair elections next year. The Pentagon will have only a modest influence over
many of these factors, as is often the case with recent civil conflicts
involving the United States.
The prospects for a peace agreement between the Afghan government
and the Taliban have experienced several ups and downs. However, few
expect a meaningful peace deal before most NATO combat troops leave
1     Bailey Cahall, “President Obama said to be considering “zero option” in Afghanistan,”
Foreign Policy AfPak Channel, July 9, 2013, http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/07/09/
president_obama_said_to_be_considering_zero_option_in_afghanistan.
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Afghanistan. In their 31 May White House news conference, President
Obama and visiting NATO Secretary General Anders Rasmussen did
not even mention the possibility of a negotiated settlement to the war.
Instead, they announced plans to hold a NATO summit in 2014 that
would finalize details for Operation Resolute Support, the alliance’s
new post-2014 train, advise, and assist mission in Afghanistan.2 Even so,
perhaps the most serious problem preventing a peace agreement is the
belief among Taliban leaders that, following the withdrawal of NATO,
the ANSF will succumb to their more highly motivated fighters.

The Challenging Transition to Afghan Lead

Despite a decade of intense work and sacrifice, the NATO-led
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan has yet
to secure its main objectives of empowering a legitimate post-Taliban
government sufficiently to ensure security throughout the country and
prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a terrorist safe haven.3 The
double military surge in Afghanistan—which saw two waves of tens
of thousands of additional US and NATO troops enter the country
following Obama’s inauguration in 2009—helped blunt the Taliban
resurgence and restore Afghan government control of the country’s
population centers, especially in the south. The Taliban generally ceased
its large-unit operations and returned to its earlier focus on targeted
assassinations, terrorist bombings, and demonstrations at high-visibility
public events. For example, the Taliban swiftly followed the 18 June
NATO-ANSF transition ceremony in Kabul with a 25 June attack on
the presidential palace and other downtown Kabul targets.4 Although
these attacks are routinely suppressed within hours, they do succeed in
challenging Afghan government morale by engendering negative commentary in the Western media about the ANSF’s inability to counter the
Taliban without a NATO combat presence.
In addition to these tactical gains, the surges provided ISAF time
to strengthen and prepare the ANSF to assume the lead role in combating the Taliban insurgents. In 2011, NATO formally launched a plan
to transition full responsibility for security to the Afghan government,
with reduced NATO training and equipping of the ANSF. The ensuing
period has seen NATO forces in Afghanistan decreasing in number and
shifting to a support role of training, advising, and assisting. Hundreds
of ISAF bases have been closed or transferred to ANSF control, while
the ANSF has assumed responsibility for ensuring security in increasing numbers of provinces, cities, and districts.5 Afghan forces began
leading the majority of frontline operations in July 2012 and now take
charge of almost all combat missions (though NATO special forces and
intelligence are still heavily involved in the concentrated attack on the
2     “Remarks by President Obama and NATO Secretary General Anders
Rasmussen After Bilateral Meeting Oval Office,” White House Office of the Press
Secretary,
May
31,
2013,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/31/
remarks-president-obama-and-nato-secretary-general-anders-rasmussen-afte
3     North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO Operations and Missions,” February 21, 2013,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52060.htm
4     Abdol Wahed Faramarz, “Tough Job Ahead for Under-Resourced Afghan
Forces,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, July 1, 2013, http://iwpr.net/report-news/
tough-job-ahead-under-resourced-afghan-forces.
5     “Unused U.S. Military Base to Be Demolished in Afghanistan,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
July 18, 2013, http://www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-us-destroys-unused-base/25042351.html.
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Taliban insurgents network).6 Most recently, the ANSF has taken charge
of planning and coordinating the joint Afghan-US patrols in eastern
Afghanistan, the last sector to transition to ANSF lead and the main
focus of this year’s counterinsurgency campaign.7 As a result, NATO
casualties in 2012 declined to a level below that of any year since 2008,
while Afghan army and police battle deaths and injuries have risen to
several hundred per month.8
Despite several high-profile showcase attacks in Kabul and elsewhere, the ANSF units have thus far been able to maintain overall
security in these transferred areas, albeit with substantial ISAF support.
Measurable progress has also occurred in terms of various metrics such as
territory under Afghan government control, captured or killed Taliban or
al-Qaeda leaders, and growth in ANSF size and missions (more brigadeand corps-level operations).9 Most recently, the Afghan government has
begun constructing a national military education infrastructure, from
elite academies to military occupational specialty schools, as well as its
own helicopter-based Air Force. When Afghan President Hamid Karzai
met with US officials in January 2013 in Washington, they agreed to
accelerate the military transition timetable (Milestone 2013). In June
2013, the ANSF assumed the lead combat role throughout the country.10
Whereas the Pentagon concluded that only one Afghan National Army
(ANA) brigade could conduct independent operations in 2012, the US
Defense Department believes that the ANA now has one corps, five
brigades, and 27 battalions capable of independent operations.11

Strategic Partnership

On 2 May 2012, officials from Kabul and Washington signed a
Strategic Partnership Agreement. Under its terms, the United States
pledged economic, security, and diplomatic assistance to Afghanistan
for ten years after 2014. In return, the Afghan government agreed to
improve accountability, transparency, and the rule of law; protect the
rights of all Afghans, regardless of gender; and pursue further domestic reforms and capacity-building programs aimed at addressing the
underlying socioeconomic, political, and other drivers of insurgency.12
Afghanistan’s cooperation with the United States and its allies will
6     Ben Barry, “The endgame in Afghanistan,” Discussion at the International Institute for Strategic Studies
(IISS), Arundel House, London, July 11, 2013, http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events-s-calendar/
the-endgame-in-afghanistan-9bb2.
7     Carlo Muñoz, “US troops adjust to Afghan National Security Forces lead
in combat ops,” The Hill, July 13, 2013, http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/
operations/310687-us-forces-adjust-to-afghan-lead-in-combat-ops.
8     Cheryl Pellerin “Afghan Forces Achieving Security Success, Official Says,” American Forces Press
Service, July 11, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=120443
9     U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in
Afghanistan,” December 2012, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/1230_Report_final.pdf
and Joseph F. Dunford, “Statement Of General Joseph F. Dunford, Commander US ForcesAfghanistan, Before The House Armed Services Committee On The Situation In Afghanistan,”
April 17, 2013,” http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS00/20130417/100660/HHRG-113AS00-Bio-DunfordUSMCG-20130417.pdf.
10     Matt Spetalnick, “Obama, Karzai accelerate end of U.S. combat role in
Afghanistan,” Reuters, Jan. 12, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/12/
us-obama-afghanistan-idUSBRE90A0ZT20130112.
11     “Statement Of General Joseph F. Dunford.”
12     “Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement between the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
and the United States of America,” May 1, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/
files/2012.06.01u.s.-afghanistanspasignedtext.pdf.
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also continue under their Enduring Partnership Agreement, signed
at NATO’s 2010 Lisbon Summit. In addition to encouraging further
domestic reforms, these framework agreements reassure the Afghan
government, as well as other United States and NATO regional partners, that they will not be abandoned despite the withdrawal of NATO’s
combat forces. The agreements also provided leverage with the Afghan
Taliban, Iran, and Pakistan by weakening their conviction that NATO
countries will simply wash their hands of responsibility for Afghanistan
after 2014. For this reason, Iran lobbied the Afghan parliament to
reject the Strategic Partnership Agreement and Iranian security forces
harassed Afghan diplomats following its approval.13
Nonetheless, the durability of the post-surge military gains remains
under question as the United States and other coalition members withdraw their forces and reduce their other military support. As of July
2013, there are approximately 65,000 US troops, 30,000 NATO forces,
and perhaps an equal number of foreign security and military support
contractors fighting on behalf of the Afghan government. More than
3,250 ISAF members (including more than 2,000 US soldiers) have been
killed in action during the Afghanistan campaign. ISAF had 130,000 soldiers at its peak strength in 2011, when 50 countries contributed combat
personnel to the mission. Western governments have been gradually
reducing forces since then. By September 2012, US force levels had fallen
from peak levels by 33,000 troops, reaching pre-surge levels.14 In his
January 2013 State of the Union address, President Obama announced
that 34,000 US troops would depart Afghanistan within a year.15 That
will lower US forces approximately 32,000 by early 2014, with further
decreases likely delayed until after the April 2014 elections. Other foreign
military contingents are following a comparably steep drawdown.
In an open congressional hearing in early 2012, a National Intelligence
Estimate issued in December 2011 was described as warning of “dire”
outcomes and a protracted “stalemate” unless ISAF and ANSF made
considerably greater progress toward their transition objectives.16 ISAF
then experienced a series of challenges in 2012 that included the burning
of Qurans inside Bagram Air Base by US soldiers, the massacre of 17
Afghan civilians by one American soldier, and the circulation of photographs of US military personnel defiling the bodies of dead Taliban
fighters. These developments contributed to an escalation of insider
attacks, when Afghan soldiers turned their weapons against United
States or other NATO forces in ugly cases of fratricide. Although these
incidents have declined in recent months, the Taliban has some supporters throughout the country. The movement sustains a strong presence in
eastern Afghanistan near its Pakistani support bases, but Taliban attacks
in north and west Afghanistan have become more frequent now that
NATO force levels in these regions have declined. In general, Taliban
fighters are using more aggressive direct attacks to supplement their
13     Sardar Ahmad, “Afghan-US Pact Strains Ties With Tehran,” Agence France-Presse, May 8, 2012.
14     U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in
Afghanistan,” December 2012, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/1230_Report_final.pdf.
15     Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Obama wants to cut troop level in Afghanistan in half over next
year,” Washington Post, February 12, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-02-12/
world/37051681_1_afghanistan-afghan-army-troop-level
16     “Senate Select Intelligence Committee Holds Hearing on Worldwide Threats,” Defense
Intelligence Agency, January 31, 2012, www.dia.mil/public-affairs/testimonies/2012-01-31.html

Dilemmas for US Strategy

Weitz

33

standard employment of improvised explosive devices (IEDs remain a
potent tool of carnage). IEDs still inflict the most casualties of ANSF
personnel. The Taliban’s growing presence and changing tactics have
contributed to higher overall ANSF casualties, more desertions, and the
periodic overrunning of poorly commanded ANA units in remote locations—though the ANSF eventually recovers many of these outposts.17
Furthermore, according to the United States Department of Defense,
“The insurgency continues to receive critical support—including sanctuary, training infrastructure, and operational and financial support—from
within neighboring Pakistan.”18 Afghan-Pakistan conflicts reoccur with
disturbing regularity over border checkpoints, cross-boundary shelling,
and Afghan claims of Pakistani collusion with the Afghan Taliban. For
more than a decade, the Taliban have enjoyed an invaluable sanctuary on
Pakistani territory from which its fighters can recruit, train, and operate
across the porous Afghan-Pakistan frontier—notwithstanding recurring American warnings that the Taliban’s activities redound negatively
on Pakistan’s own stability. Meanwhile, Karzai stokes anti-Pakistan sentiment to mobilize Afghan nationalist support, which can provide an
excuse for Afghan leaders to blame setbacks on Islamabad rather than
try to overcome them through needed domestic reforms.19

Afghan Capability Challenges

The ANSF has grown faster than expected, reaching its full complement months ahead of schedule. Between December 2009 and October
2012, the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) helped
the ANSF expand by more than 140,000 personnel, to approximately
352,000 soldiers. Notwithstanding its larger size, growing responsibilities, and ISAF’s extensive train and equip program, the ANSF still has
major weaknesses and gaps, such as insufficient airborne and signals
intelligence capabilities, spotty senior officer leadership, inadequately
robust logistics given the country’s weak national infrastructure and
challenging geography, and weak management and administrative
skills. In particular, the ANA lacks adequate enablers such as aviation,
casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), combat medical support, and CounterImprovised Explosive Device (CIED) capabilities. The Army has only
28 Mi-17 helicopters, the primary CASEVAC aircraft.20 The ANA
officer corps is thin in key qualities such as literacy, leadership, aggressiveness, and management skills. It also does not have an ideal ethnic
balance. Further work is needed to teach the Afghans better gunnery,
engineering, and weapons maintenance skills. In terms of morale, ANA
units suffer from high desertion and defection rates, aggravated by a
persistent shortage of noncommissioned officers (NCOs).21 The Afghan
National Police (ANP), especially the newer Afghan Local Police (ALP)
deployed in remote locations as a human-and-physical-terrain-denial
17     Nick Hopkins, “Taliban kill 1,100 Members of Afghan Security Forces in Six
Months,” The Guardian, January 23, 2013. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jan/23/
taliban-afghan-security-forces-nato]
18     U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in
Afghanistan,” December 2012, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/1230_Report_final.pdf.
19     Ben Barry, “The endgame in Afghanistan.”
20     Jim Michaels, “Afghan forces blunt Taliban offensive, commanders say,” USA TODAY, July
2, 2013.
21     “Statement Of General Joseph F. Dunford.”
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and intelligence-gathering force, also needs better equipment and training before it can fulfill its important mission of preventing the Taliban
from returning to areas conquered by the ANA.
The ANSF needs a better human capital strategy. Although the
ANSF still suffers from high levels of attrition, especially among the
locally recruited police, widespread poverty ensures a large number of
recruits eager for gainful employment. The main challenge now is to
raise the quality of much of the ANSF, ideally to the high level found
in the Afghan Special Operations Forces (ASOF). ISAF has focused
on imparting skills through training and mentoring, while the Afghan
Ministry of Defense concentrates on removing incompetent field commanders and improving its vetting and retention processes.22 NATO’s
Security Force Assistance has changed from that of partnering and
combat to using its Security Force Assistance Teams (SFATs) to train,
advise, and assist sponsored ANSF units to conduct independent combat
operations. Afghan political and military leaders are generally satisfied
with this progress, though some complain about NATO’s resistance to
their efforts to obtain tanks, combat aircraft, and major conventional
weapons systems.23 The alliance is building the ANSF into a primarily counterinsurgency force rather than a conventional military given
the absence of threats to Afghanistan by other countries’ conventional
armed forces.
With ISAF support, the ANSF has adopted a “layered security
concept” that compensates for weaknesses in each element of the ANSF.
The concept seeks to address persistent coordination problems between
them (especially between the ANA and ANP) by integrating all ANSF
elements into a joint defense in depth. This interlocking protection web
encompasses the ANA, ANP, ALP, ASOF, Afghan Border Police, the
National Directorate of Security (NDS), and other ANSF elements,
which will soon include Mobile Strike Force battalions, which move
by ground vehicles. An Operational Coordination Center (OCC) will
control the network as well as disseminate relevant tactical intelligence
among its components. ISAF still provides enablers for this layered
defense system, especially aviation assets, but the forces in the field are
almost all ANSF personnel.24

Air Power Problems

Combat aviation presents a special problem. Analysts believe that it
will not be until 2017 that the Afghan Air Force, whose presence could
at least strengthen local pride and morale, will be able to operate without
substantial foreign assistance.25 Aviation has proved to be a key asymmetrical advantage for ISAF and Afghan partners since the Taliban lacks
any air support. ISAF air surveillance and strikes provide one of the
most effective instruments for countering Taliban infiltration across the
Afghan-Pakistan border—a persistent problem that looks unlikely to be
22     “A Discussion on Afghanistan with General John Allen,” Brookings Institution, March 25, 2013,
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2013/03/25-allen-afghanistan#ref-id=20130325_allen
23     “Can Afghans take the lead?,” Inside Story, Aljazeera, June 18, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.
com/programmes/insidestory/2013/06/201361872036451240.html.
24     “Statement of General Dunford” and “Discussion with General Allen.”
25     Josh Smith, “Afghan Aircrews Training To Proceed Without Foreign Aid,” Stars and Stripes,
February 22, 2013.

Dilemmas for US Strategy

Weitz

35

resolved anytime soon. But ISAF has found it difficult to build a new
Afghan Air Force from scratch given the country’s austere conditions,
bad weather, and remote forward locations of ANSF units that need
aerial supply, aerial surveillance, and air casualty evacuations air surveillance. The greatest challenge is the time required to train enough skilled
Afghans sufficiently to maintain and operate an air force.
At present, the United States Air Force (USAF) is pursuing a
graduated approach toward transferring missions to their Afghan counterparts, with a slower pace of drawdown than seen with the US Army
and Marines. NATO is providing the ANSF with indirect fire weapons
such as artillery to compensate for the reduced ISAF combat air support.26 The expectation is that ANSF ground forces will need to adapt
and fight differently, with less combat air support, after 2015. NATO
could also rely on US air assets located over-the-horizon in other countries even after 2014.27 However, whether NATO governments would
order something such as a spoiling air strike in 2015 or beyond against
Taliban forces that began to pose a significant threat is uncertain.
Since the NATO combat withdrawal decision makes it harder for
the Taliban to claim it is fighting to rid the country of foreign troops,
Taliban leaders rely on exploiting their narrative of Western abandonment of Afghanistan. A common message is that, whereas NATO is
removing its combat forces from Afghanistan, the Taliban fighters will
remain. To counter this narrative, NATO planners are reconsidering
their earlier decision to reduce the ANSF to 230,000 troops after 2015
for affordability reasons. The February 2013 NATO defense ministry
formally considered supporting the larger force until 2018 as a means to
better ensure Afghanistan’s security, but perhaps even more importantly
as a means to counter the abandonment narrative that NATO planners see as a greater threat to the alliance’s campaign goals than the
Taliban.28 But actually sustaining the larger force will require greater
financial contributions from NATO and non-NATO countries than
currently planned, despite the continued global economic slowdown
and other priorities. General Joseph Dunford, Commander US ForcesAfghanistan, recently warned that, “The gains that we have made to
date are not going to be sustainable without continued international
commitment,” quickly adding that, “We are not where we need to be
yet.”29 Whether these supplementary finances will soon materialize is
doubtful, but ISAF and NATO can make meaningful progress toward
overall economic development by continuing to combat illiteracy and
innumeracy, promoting the recruitment of national minorities within
the ANSF, and imparting more dual-use technical skills that have civilian application, including project and logistics management.

26     Michaels, “Afghan forces blunt Taliban offensive.”
27     US Department of Defense, “Department of Defense Press Briefing with Maj. Gen.
Polumbo from the Pentagon Briefing Room,” April 23, 2013, defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.
aspx?transcriptid=5225.
28     Adam Entous and Naftali Bendavi, “U.S., NATO Consider Keeping Large Force Of
Afghans,” Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2013.
29     “Afghan gains not yet sustainable: NATO,” The Australian, June 15, 2013, http://
www.theaustralian.com.au/news/breaking-news/afghan-gains-not-yet-sustainable-nato/
story-fn3dxix6-1226664184461.
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Overcoming Insider Threats

The surge in “green-on-blue” attacks, in which supposedly friendly
Afghan soldiers turn their weapons on their ISAF advisers, has impeded
efforts to address the ANSF weaknesses. These “insider attacks” represent a major problem since they exploit a crucial vulnerability by
seeking to disrupt the vital ISAF partnership and training programs
with their ANSF colleagues. The highest annual total of insider attacks
occurred in 2012, when there were at least 60 confirmed cases of ISAF
troops being killed, which accounted for more than one-fifth of all ISAF
combat deaths that year (almost one hundred more ISAF soldiers were
wounded).
Year
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012

No. of
Attacks
2
2
6
6
21
46

No. of
ISAF Casualties
2
2
10
20
35
60

Table 1. Afghan "green-on-blue" attacks. Source: International Security Assistance
Force; as of March 2013; some attacks in 2012 are still under investigation and not
included above.30

NATO analysts assess that only 10-25% of the attacks are directly
caused by Taliban action (infiltration, impersonation, co-option, etc.),
attributing most attacks to personal grievances (inter-personal disputes),
or spontaneous action (retaliation for some obnoxious act committed
by the Western countries, such as burning of Korans or showing antiIslamic films, or simply post-traumatic stress).31 Yet, the Taliban tactic
of claiming responsibility for all these attacks unnerved ISAF advisers,
who at times interacted less, or under more restrictive conditions, with
their Afghan counterparts. On several occasions, NATO removed its
advisers from Afghan work posts and suspended partnered operations
in the field. The French government explicitly cited the insider attacks,
which killed several French soldiers, to justify the withdrawal of French
combat forces earlier than originally planned.
The rapid increase in the ANSF’s ranks contributed to this insider
problem since it led to a relaxation of recruitment and supervisory
standards.32 The surge in the number of ISAF advisers collocated with
ANSF personnel also increased the number of targets. At one point,
almost 5,000 NTM-A trainers served in Afghan institutions, while 400
ISAF military and police advisory teams deployed with ANSF units in
the field. They trained more than 3,200 ANSF instructors in a “train30     “What lies behind Afghanistan’s insider attacks?” BBC, March 11, 2013, http://www.bbc.
co.uk/news/world-asia-19633418.
31     Luke Mogelson, “Which Way Did The Taliban Go?” New York Times Magazine, January 20,
2013.
32     “Statement Of General Dunford.”
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the-trainers” program aimed to allow NTM-A to reduce its presence like
the rest of NATO.33 Even if only one of every 500 Afghan soldiers turns
his weapons on an ISAF colleague, that figure yields dozens of attacks
given the ANSF’s large size.
ISAF Commanding General John Allen recognized that foreign
forces had to rely on fellow Afghans to use their superior cultural knowledge and human intelligence to curtail such incidents. ISAF partnered
with the Afghan government to adopt a comprehensive response strategy, which aimed to reduce the number of “green-on-green” attacks in
which ANSF personnel attacked their Afghan comrades. Afghan and
ISAF personnel took measures to improve vetting and screening of new
ANSF recruits; enhance counterintelligence efforts; make ISAF and
Afghan personnel more aware of each other’s cultural sensitivities as well
as behavioral traits of potential attackers; designate Guardian Angels to
protect ISAF soldiers from insider attacks; and deploy mobile training
teams to enhance force protection against insider threats. Furthermore,
the ongoing reduction in the size of the ISAF mission and its use of
smaller ISAF advisory units (security force assistance teams) embedded
for long periods in only high-level ANSF units reduced the number of
opportunities and targets for insider attacks. Most of the green-on-blue
attacks do not involve soldiers who serve together on a constant basis.
Rather, attackers find it easier to kill people whom they encounter in
episodic or random contacts.

The Post-2014 NATO Mission

A critical question remains unresolved: how many United States and
other foreign troops should remain after 2014 and what missions should
they undertake? The Pentagon and other NATO militaries are assessing
numerous variables as they decide how many forces they should recommend remain (hence the range in numbers): the ANSF’s performance this
year; the strength of the Taliban and al-Qaeda; progress in the Afghan
peace and reconciliation process; the April 2014 elections process; and
the regional security environment (especially the policies and performance of the new Pakistani government).34 Determining how many ISAF
troops stay after 2014 and how fast other soldiers can leave Afghanistan
also requires establishing in advance what specific missions NATO will
perform after 2014. In principle, these tasks could include defending
the Afghan population; protecting foreign civilian workers; killing and
capturing key Taliban leaders; and building the ANSF through further
training and advising in accordance with the transition plan NATO
developed in 2010 and reaffirmed at its May 2012 Chicago summit.
The February 2013 NATO defense ministerial discussed how many
forces to keep in Afghanistan beyond 2014, what they will do, and how
rapidly other forces would depart. The numbers under consideration at
that meeting ranged from 8,000 to 12,000 military personnel, with most
of these troops coming from the United States and other NATO countries, as well as from a few NATO partners in ISAF such as Australia.
33     ISAF Headquarters Public Affairs Office, “ISAF Press Briefing September 5, 2011,” http://
www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/isaf-press-briefing-september-5-2011.html
34      Peter R. Lavoy, “Embargoed Until Delivered,” Testimony of Dr. Peter R. Lavoy before the United
States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, July 11, 2013, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/Lavoy_Testimony.pdf
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The United States might contribute between one half and two thirds to
this total. The NATO ministers are now using this figure as a “planning” guidepost for pacing their own 2013-2014 reductions.35 This
number represents the middle-range of the three figures the Pentagon
presented to NATO last November, but seems less than the US military
commanders in the field would prefer.36 The larger NATO force would
amount to roughly 18,000 to 23,000 troops, while the smallest option
discussed in November 2012 was from 3,000 to 6,000 troops.37

Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) Stress

Until recently, there had been no serious discussion of a “zero
option” for US troop presence, but keeping NATO military forces in
Afghanistan beyond 2014 depends on the successful negotiations of
a SOFA between the Afghan government and various international
partners, which would define the legal rights and responsibilities of
the foreign forces. When he met Karzai this January in Washington,
Obama insisted that the new US-Afghan Bilateral Security Agreement
under negotiation to replace the existing US-Afghan SOFA would have
to provide comprehensive legal immunity for US troops in Afghanistan.
Karzai has accepted this condition in principle, but the issue proved
sufficiently controversial in the case of Iraq as to prevent any American
forces (besides the standard Marine Guards, etc.) from remaining in that
country after 2011. Relations between Karzai and Obama grew so testy
in the summer of 2013 over proposed peace talks with the Taliban, with
Karzai accusing Obama in a video link of seeking a separate peace with
the Taliban, that the administration let it be known that the zero option
was under serious discussion.38 But Karzai’s entourage might be correct
that such talk was simply a negotiating ploy that neither side could ever
accept given their mutual need for some US military presence for both
Afghan and regional security considerations.39 The White House might
announce its intent to keep a major troop presence in Afghanistan after
2014 while simultaneously declaring that the United States was prepared
to negotiate the SOFA with the next Afghan government as well as the
Karzai administration.40 In addition to defusing the immediate crisis,
this approach would reflect the reality that Karzai’s successor could
repudiate any deal negotiated by his predecessor.

35     Adam Entous, “U.S. Sets Out Post-2014 NATO Force For Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal,
February 23, 2013.
36     “The Afghan Horizon: ‘Afghanistan will not stand alone’ — NATO declaration,”
Chicago Tribune, January 19, 2013; Carlo Muñoz, “US Military Advisers: Impasse Won’t Stop
Handoff to Afghan Troops,” The Hill, July 9, 2013, http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/
army/309791-us-military-advisers-impasse-wont-stop-handoff-to-afghan-troops.
37     Adam Entous, “U.S. Sets Out Post-2014 NATO Force For Afghanistan,” Wall Street Journal,
February 23, 2013.
38     Mark Mazzetti and Matthew Rosenberg, “U.S. Considers Faster Pullout in
Afghanistan,” The New York Times, July 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/
world/asia/fr ustrated-obama-considers-full-troop-withdrawal-from-afghanistan.
html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&ref=asia&pagewanted=all&.
39     “United States could leave Afghanistan early as tension between Obama,
Karzai
mounts,”
Reuters,
July
9,
2013,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
world/u-s-pull-troops-afghanistan-year-report-article-1.1393607#ixzz2YfnwGXZ9.
40     Stephen Hadley, “Assessing the Transition in Afghanistan,” Testimony before the U.S. Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, July 11, 2013, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hadley_
Testimony.pdf.
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The February 2013 NATO defense ministerial discussed the alliance’s post-2014 train, advise, and assist mission. NATO is considering
establishing training bases in the four main sectors of Afghanistan as
well as a central headquarters in Kabul. The training mission might
keep the current leading roles of Germany in the north, Italy in the
west, and the United States in the east and the south. NATO trainers
would work with ANSF units only at the corps level and conduct all
their training on bases rather than in the field. 41 Most likely, American
soldiers in Afghanistan after 2014 will be assigned to units having at
least one of three broad missions: advising and training select ANSF
units as part of the post-2014 NATO force; protecting State Department
and other civilian personnel on interagency missions; and capturing or
killing high-value terrorists in Afghanistan as part of a separate counterterrorism force under US command. Unlike NATO trainers, this
counterterrorism force of several thousand US military personnel would
have US Special Operations Forces (SOF) embedded with lower-level
Afghan units such as the Afghan SOF brigades. Some of these SOF
personnel could be dual-hatted to perform US counterterrorism and
NATO training missions. It is possible that these SOF forces might
also support high-priority missions in neighboring countries, ranging
from killing terrorists to neutralizing weapons of mass destruction (like
a Pakistani nuclear weapon) that might fall under the control of a terrorist group.

Concluding Observations

The prospects for a peace agreement with the Taliban have risen
and then fallen in recent months, with much attention paid to allowing the Taliban to establish a negotiating office in Doha. The initiative
backfired after the Taliban representatives tried to fly their old flag and
name it after their deposed government, leading Karzai to accuse them
of seeking to establish a government-in-exile with American connivance.42 Yet, the Karzai government has contributed to the peace problem
by pursuing several, often conflicting negotiating tracks, dealing with
self-proclaimed Taliban representatives who lack much influence with
the movement, and leaving much of Afghan society fearful that the
government will reach a deal with Taliban leaders and other local elites
at their expense.
In any case, it seems unlikely that a settlement is achievable before
most US combat forces leave. Even if the talks start soon, the experience
of other negotiations seeking to end a civil war suggest they will likely
take considerable time to realize a deal. The parties need to feel comfortable working with one another, compromise their initial demands,
and then sell any deal to their respective leaderships. On the government side, there will need to be a means to incorporate the interests
and demands of many Afghan stakeholders who now feel excluded
from the peace process. Regarding the Taliban, its leaders still reject US
demands that they negotiate directly with Karzai’s government, adopt
41     Thom Shanker, “NATO in Talks on Scale of Afghan Role After 2014 Deadline,” The New
York Times, February 23, 2013.
42     Kathy Gannon, “Taliban Close Qatar Office to Protest Flag Fracas,” Associated Press, July
9, 2013, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/taliban-close-qatar-office-protest-flagfracas-19613331#.Udv_Wz5hlSY.
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a formal cease-fire, sever ties with international terrorist organizations
like al-Qaeda, and acknowledge the legitimacy of the post-2001 Afghan
Constitution.43 Another complication is that the Taliban consists of
many fighters who are motivated by local grievances that will not be
resolved by curtailing the NATO military presence or in peace talks with
the central government. Whether the Taliban has a genuinely moderate
wing able to induce the rest to support a peace deal remains unclear.

Prospects for Success

The ANSF has been making steady progress in improving its fighting
capabilities, but its long-term capacity will be challenged by an expected
loss of interest and support in NATO capitals after their troops leave
the field. Much attention has been paid to whether we will have a zero
option (or zero outcome, with no US troops after 2014), but this debate
often overlooks that, whatever the military rationale for any troop presence, symbolism becomes important. A larger foreign troop presence
can better counter the abandonment narrative, though it would be wise
to concentrate those troops that remain in few basing facilities to minimize their force protection requirements. A more urgent question is the
pace of any drawdown. A straight-line or accelerated withdrawal to 2014
could prematurely undermine the still vital US training mission of the
ANSF. A better strategy would be to keep as many troops as possible in
Afghanistan for as long as possible. Not only will this provide the ANSF
with better training and the US forces with more combat opportunities,
but it would better support the enormous task of moving large volumes
of US and NATO defense items out of the country as well as the troops.
Beyond 2014, the United States could best achieve its core counterterrorism objective of preventing the return of al Qaeda or other
transnational terrorists to Afghanistan by being able to continue drone
strikes in Afghanistan, perhaps using bases in a neighboring country
if a new US–Afghan SOFA proves elusive. Sustaining some Pakistani
support for the US-backed Afghan war effort, as well as for the larger
war on terror, will also prove critical. The Pakistan–United States relationship is held together by common interests rather than a genuine
sense of partnership or shared values. The war in Afghanistan has been
a source of tension between them but also helped hold them together.
With the US military withdrawal, and the resulting decline in US aid to
Islamabad, this source of cooperation will weaken.
In addition to the combat issues, a key test for this new arrangement
could be Afghanistan’s April 2014 national elections. In its partnership
agreements with NATO and the United States, in the July 2012 Tokyo
Conference Mutual Accountability Framework, and in other ways, the
Afghan government has pledged to make governance and other reforms
in return for continued foreign security and economic support. In
particular, Afghan authorities have committed to conduct free and fair
elections, under international supervision and with independent election
commissioners, in which none of the candidates or parties would receive
special administrative resources or other inappropriate advantages to tilt
what should be a level playing field. If the Afghan political institutions
43     James F. Dobbins, “Assessing the Transition in Afghanistan,” Testimony Before the U.S.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 11, 2013, http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
Dobbins_Testimony.pdf.
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perform as badly as in the 2009 national ballot, if the ANSF fails to
provide a safe and secure electoral environment, or if President Karzai
decides to renege on his vow not to run for reelection (or cynically
orchestrates a close relative or associate as his successor), then international enthusiasm for the entire Afghan project would substantially
diminish. But the decreasing Western military presence and interest in
Afghanistan is reducing US leverage in this and other areas.

